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LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (Apr. 3, 2014)1
CRIMINAL LAW: LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES, DOUBLE JEOPARDY & HABITUAL
CRIMINAL STATUTES
Summary
The Court determined whether (1) the sufficiency of the evidence supported the
defendant’s domestic battery by strangulation and domestic battery causing substantial bodily
harm convictions; (2) the convictions and sentences for possession with intent to sell and simple
possession based on possession of the same controlled substance violates the Double Jeopardy
Clause; (3) the defendant received adequate notice of the State’s intent to seek habitual criminal
status; and (4) the district court properly adjudicated the defendant as a habitual criminal.
Disposition
Double jeopardy analysis is based solely on the elements of the principal offense, and
simple possession is the lesser-included offense to possession with intent to sell. Even if a
defendant is adjudicated as a habitual criminal and could be sentenced to a lengthier punishment
for the lesser-included offense, this conviction must be vacated if also found guilty of possession
with intent to sell.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellant, LaChance got into an argument with his girlfriend at his home. After slapping,
punching, and choking her, she tried to escape. LaChance chased her down and continued to beat
her. After a neighbor said she was calling the police, LaChance fled the scene. The girlfriend was
treated at a hospital and suffered significant injuries to her ear, neck, abdomen, pelvis, and
extremities. She now suffers from permanent shin splints, can no longer run, and also suffers
from ongoing pain. Upon his arrest, LaChance had in his possession 4.6lbs of marijuana and
several scales. A jury convicted LaChance of domestic battery by strangulation, domestic battery
causing substantial bodily harm, possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale,
possession of a controlled substance, false imprisonment, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
LaChance appeals, claiming the evidence was insufficient to support conviction for
domestic battery by strangulation and domestic battery causing substantial bodily harm.
Discussion
Sufficiency of the evidence
The Court considers sufficiency of the evidence attacks by reviewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a “rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”2
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Domestic battery by strangulation
The Court rejected LaChance’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the conviction for domestic battery by strangulation. LaChance argued that only speculation and
ambiguous statements support this conviction and any difficulty in breathing resulted from the
victim’s anxiety. Noting the Legislature defined strangulation as “impeding the normal breathing
. . . by applying pressure on the throat or neck,” the Court concluded that a rational trier of fact
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that LaChance strangled the victim and affirmed the
conviction.
Domestic battery causing substantial bodily harm
The Court also rejected LaChance’s challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the “substantial bodily harm” element of the domestic battery causing substantial
bodily harm conviction. LaChance argued that where this element is based on prolonged pain,
the pain must also be substantial. The Court rejected this contention observing that existing case
law states that liability for “prolonged physical pain” arises when “some physical suffering or
injury . . . lasts longer than the pain immediately resulting” from the battery.3 Noting the severity
of the victim’s injuries, including permanent shin splints and hearing loss in one ear, the Court
concluded that the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that the victim suffered
prolonged physical pain and affirmed the conviction.
Lesser-included offenses
The Court agreed with LaChance’s double jeopardy argument and vacated his conviction
for simple possession. LaChance argued that the convictions and sentences for possession with
intent to sell and the lesser-included offense of simple possession based on the possession of the
same controlled substance violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The State responded that
because the first offense includes a weight element and the second offense includes an intent
element, simple possession is not a lesser-included offense of possession with intent to sell. The
Court reviewed this claim for constitutional or plain error.4
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments for the same offense,
but it does not prohibit multiple punishments if the Legislature clearly authorizes them. 5 If
legislative intent is unclear, the Blockburger test determines the permissibility of multiple
punishments for the same offense. 6 Under Blockburger, a person cannot be convicted of a
greater- and lesser-included offense when “the offense in question cannot be committed without
committing the lesser offense.”7
In Nevada, the statute for possession with an intent to sell states that “it is unlawful for a
person to possess for the purpose of sale. . . any controlled substance classified in schedule I or
II.”8 The simple possession statute states that “[a] person shall not knowingly or intentionally
possess a controlled substance.”9
The Court concluded the elements of simple possession are included in the elements for
possession with intent to sell, and if convicted of possession with intent to sell, the defendant
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would also be convicted of simple possession. Therefore, the Court determined the conviction
for both offenses violates double jeopardy.10
Having determined that the dual conviction violated double jeopardy, the Court vacated
LaChance’s conviction for simple possession, the lesser included offense. While the Court
typically vacates the conviction with the lesser sentence, LaChance’s adjudication as a habitual
criminal complicated this case. The State argued that because the simple possession conviction,
enhanced pursuant to the habitual criminal adjudication, yielded a longer sentence than the
possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale, the latter sentence should be
vacated. The Court rejected this argument, noting that double jeopardy doctrine requires
comparing the range of punishments only for the principle offense.
Notice of intent to seek habitual criminal adjudication
The Court rejected LaChance’s argument that the district court committed plain error and
violated his constitutional rights by allowing habitual criminal adjudication without an
arraignment indicating that the State was seeking habitual criminal treatment. The Court rejected
this argument for two reasons. First, LaChance agreed to the procedure used in this case. Second,
the clear purpose of the habitual criminal statute is to ensure that the defendant has notice that
the State will request this status. In the present case, LaFrance had written notice. Moreover,
habitual criminal adjudication is not an offense but a status determination not subject to jury
determination. Therefore, there is no need for a preliminary hearing or arraignment. Since
LaChance did not have those rights as to habitual criminal allegation, the error could not have
substantially affected those rights.
Adjudicating La Chance as a habitual criminal
The Court affirmed the district court’s decision to adjudicate LaChance as a habitual
criminal. Adjudicating a defendant as a habitual criminal is “subject to the broadest kind of
judicial discretion.”11 In determining if a finding of habitual criminal is proper, “this court looks
to the record as a whole to determine whether the sentencing court actually exercised its
discretion.”12 A sentencing court meets its obligations so long as it “was not operating under a
misconception of the law regarding the discretionary nature of a habitual criminal
adjudication.”13 Moreover, in considering the enhancement, the “court may consider facts such
as a defendant's criminal history, mitigation evidence, victim impact statements and the like.”14
The court may "dismiss a count under NRS 207.010 when the prior offenses are stale or
trivial, or in other circumstances where an adjudication of habitual criminality would not serve
the purposes of the statute or the interests of justice.”15 The “habitual criminality statute exists to
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enable the criminal justice system to deal determinedly with career criminals who pose a serious
threat to public safety.”16
LaChance finally argued that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to have the State adhere to the habitual
criminal statute. Concerned with the requisite number of previous felonies required for the
habitual criminal adjudication, LaChance suggested that the Court should adopt the majority rule
that multiple punishments entered during the same time period are considered only one felony.
Due to the time periods between his felonies, he was only imprisoned twice. The State argued
that the habitual criminal enhancement is not concerned with the number of times the individual
passes through the prison system but is concerned with the number of convictions. The State
suggested that the Court should not usurp the legislative function and recognize that the habitual
criminal statute as written, which makes no references to prison sentences.
Nevada’s habitual criminal statute states that a person who has been convicted of at least
three felonies is a habitual criminal and shall be punished for a category A felony. However,
“[t]he trial judge may, at his or her discretion, dismiss a [habitual criminal] count[,] . . . which is
included in any indictment or information.”17
Based on the language and intent of the statute, the Court has held “that where two or more
convictions grow out of the same act, transaction or occurrence, and are prosecuted in the same
indictment or information, those several convictions may be utilized only as a single 'prior
conviction' for purposes of applying the habitual criminal statute.”18 This rule “is consistent with
the policy and purpose of the recidivist statute. By enacting the habitual criminal statute, the
legislature sought to discourage repeat offenders and to afford them an opportunity to reform.”19
LaChance gave the Court no reason to depart from its prior interpretation of the statutory
scheme and impose additional time-period constraints on prior convictions that are not provided
for in the statute. The statute permits reform between crimes, and this time for reform does not
hinge on arrests. Therefore, the Court refused to impose additional constraints on the district
court's discretionary determination of whether habitual criminal adjudication is warranted.
LaChance had been convicted of five prior felonies, and at least three separate and distinct
prior felony convictions for the purpose of applying the habitual criminal statute. The Court
concluded that the district court was well within its discretion to adjudicate LaChance as a
habitual criminal.
Conclusion
The Court reversed the conviction for the simple possession conviction, the lesser-included
offense in this instance, and affirmed the remaining convictions. Furthermore, the defendant had
received adequate notice of the State’s intent to seek habitual criminal status, and the district
court was within its broad discretion to adjudicate the defendant as a habitual criminal.
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